The Spreading Conflict: Challenges to Iraq

These personal notes represent the views of the NCF’s Secretary General. They should not be taken as an NCF position but have been compiled using the resources of the NCF team.

The spreading conflict: Challenges to Iraq

                                                   

The Syrian conflict has always threatened to engulf the neighbouring countries. Its impact on Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan has been considerable. Now Iraq is being affected. It begs the question: how stable is Iraq and can it withstand the turmoil across its border? But the thing is you can’t just look at Iraq to get a good overview of the situation. You need to examine the whole region. So we’ll start with the big boy:

Turkey

The Turks are negotiating with the Kurdish PKK. Now why? You know how bad relationships have been between the Turkish government and the PKK[1] – or like me do you forget things? There have been so very many terrorist attacks in Turkey. And if you take the long view over a thirty year period then 40,000 have died in the conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurdish militants (mostly during that huge operation to restore government control of South East Turkey in the late 80s and early 90s).

So I’ll answer my own question. Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has messed up on Syria. His Syrian policy has already prompted some Turks to express concern. But the Syria issue is not at the heart of the “what is the Turkish motive” question.

In the 2011 elections, Erdoğan’s AK party (which has links with the Muslim Brotherhood[2]) won power again but the problem is that Erdoğan, Turkey’s most successful politician since Ataturk, wants to retain power. Now Turkey has a powerful Premier and less powerful President. But it wasn’t always that way. Once upon a time the President was powerful[3]. Erdoğan’s plan is to restore the power of the Presidency and to take the post himself.

Erdoğan is not worried that AKP will lose popularity as a result of Syria – it might have an effect in the provinces adjacent to the Syrian frontier, but we doubt whether it would have a serious electoral impact elsewhere.  There is no serious alternative party around to challenge AKP. 

Erdoğan’s problem is a personal one:  the AKP has a couple of party rules which are unique to it – the other parties do not have them.  One states that an individual cannot be adopted by the party as a parliamentary candidate more than three consecutive times.  The other says you cannot run for party leader more than three consecutive times.  Erdoğan is thus now in his last parliamentary term and stint as party leader.  Rules of course can be changed, but he has made a big thing about AKP being different from other parties, and he has repeatedly stated that he will not be standing again.  Thus the only serious option for him to have a political future is to become President.  

The election will be next year – and for the first time (as a result of a 2007 constitutional change) the President will be directly elected by the people.  Erdoğan is most unlikely to face any serious competitor unless the political elements underpinning the ruling party fragment in some way.  There is general agreement between the parties about the need for a new constitution – but not about what that constitution should contain.  The AKP wants to introduce a presidential system (thus of course reducing the competence of parliament) – the other parties don’t.  However, Erdoğan might get the support of the Kurdish BDP[4] (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi = Peace and Democracy Party) for a new draft constitution which could be submitted to referendum.  That is the motive (for the ruling party) in pushing the PKK agreement.  Of course, if the Kurdish question is “solved”, he would reap a considerable reward, both domestically in terms of votes and internationally in terms of prestige, which is perhaps another motive.

Oh and by the way – that being the case there is little or no prospect of any Turkish invasion of Syria.

As we move deeper into this winter of discontent, civilian casualty figures finally show signs of decreasing, while government and rebel figures have stabilized (the NCF carefully compiles and assesses death tolls from all available sources – we regard our figures as closer to an approximation of the real position than those of any other single source – especially if used to indicate trends). The steady emptying of the cities and countryside as the people flee the fighting to take refuge in neighbouring states accounts, in part, for the lower civilian death toll. Those displaced have expressed great anger at the negligence of the Arab world and the international community for not acting. Over 700,000 refugees continue to live in dire conditions in refugee camps. If, as seems likely, present trends continue, these numbers will reach over 1.1 million before the summer. 

Meanwhile  Moaz al-Khatib, the leader of the Western backed National Coalition faction of the Syrian Opposition, stated he was willing to hold direct talks with the Syrian Government. This came following talks with Russian and Iranian foreign ministers on 2 February 2013. However, some of his supporters from the Syrian National Council reacted negatively, rejecting any negotiations with the Syrian government whilst other more secular groups not in the National Coalition said they favoured talks which, in common with Moaz al-Khatib, they argued could halt the killings and destruction.

The US has remained staunch in its stand regarding the situation in Syria. Although the Obama administration has called for President Assad to step down, they claim a direct military intervention would trigger more violence and this could lead to greater chaos and carnage. According to UN-Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, Syria is being destroyed “bit by bit” and “unprecedented levels of horror have been reached”. He urged the UN Security Council to overcome their differences and “grapple with this problem now”.  

Russia remains in the lead on Syria and everyone is heading for Moscow in droves. The opposition is having a hard time and has started the usual rumour mill. They’re spreading around the rumour that Maher, the President’s brother, is dead. According to them he died in Moscow having been flown there for treatment after being severely wounded in the legs. This is quite untrue – Maher is alive. Then they have also been saying the President’s mother and sister fled to Abu Dhabi. They certainly went there to visit and it is unclear whether they are back home yet.

The main point is that Syria is on the road to an interim salvation government prior to Bashar stepping down in May 2014 and everyone is invited to the ‘negotiate the future’ party. Even the Iranians have agreed. Therefore it is important to watch what Sayed Jalili has to say. He is Iran’s National Security boss and says that, “On Syria we support national dialogue and say no to violence but yes to democracy”.

Everyone’s focus now is on who will replace Bashar as the new ruler of Syria. They need and will have a non-Salafist. That’s an absolute red line for the USA, Russia and Iran. Beyond that they don’t care too much.

Names in the frame include some of the old guard. An older person is viewed as acceptable because at least he or she is a known quantity. By way of example: The communist Turkman, Abdulrazak Eid, is a name that has cropped up. He’s a 62 year old writer and reformer. Another possibility is Michelle Kilo, the 72 year old Christian intellectual and human rights activist. But it’s anybody’s guess really and there are a number of possibilities. There is a danger too that naming people too soon ‘burns their credibility’, so we will not try to compile an accurate list of frontrunners.

Saudi Arabia

The Saudis have generally dug their heels in. Their conflict with Qatar has reached new heights since they stomped on the Qatar-Bahrain causeway plan. We can but hope that they are stepping back from their policy of backing the Salafists.

At least there is a new team at the top of the Saudi Government which seems like it could potentially be much more progressive in responding to some of the critical issues facing the region, including Syria and Bahrain.

Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, next in line to the Saudi throne, died in Switzerland following an illness on the 16th of June 2012. He had been Deputy Prime Minister and was the long-standing (since 1975) and hardline Interior Minister. Nayef was the most conservative of the leading Saudi princes, and with his son, Muhammad bin Nayef at his side as his deputy,  spearheaded the country's post-September 11 crackdown on al-Qaeda.

Nayef’s younger brother, Prince Salman, became Crown Prince after being the Minister of Defence since the death of his full brother Sultan and the governor of Riyadh for nearly five decades.

Now, Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, former head of the Saudi intelligence and Governor of Madina and Hail and the youngest son of the kingdom's founder Abd al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman Al Saud, has been recently named the country's second deputy prime minister by King Abdullah. The announcement places Muqrin third in line to the throne and at the top of the kingdom's power structure.

Michael Stephens, an analyst at the Doha-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think-tank, described the move as “buying time for the next generation" -- especially as the first Deputy Prime Minister and second in line to the throne, 77-year-old Prince Salman, is reported to be in ill health.

Stephens further noted that it is anticipated that Muqrin will “continue Abdullah's policy of slow and cautious change and ensure that his legacy as a moderniser is secure”.

With Prince Muqrin ascending to third-in-line to the throne and with competent second generation princes, Muhammad bin Nayef and Khalid bin Bandar, now in key decision-making positions as the Minister of Interior and Governor of Riyadh respectively, it is hoped that the wise King Abdullah has put into place a government strong enough to withstand the serious challenges which are currently buffeting both the region and the kingdom itself.

Iraq

Iraq is really the worry. The Syrian uprising has been spreading. There has been trouble in the provinces of Anbar, Salaheddine, and Nineveh.  Largely this has been in the nature of demonstrations, very well organised demonstrations, promoted by the Baathist / Islamist alliance. And they are getting out of hand. This in an Iraq which is already riven with tensions.

Many Iraqis used to blame Saudi Arabia and Qatar for their problems. Not so today. Today the Saudis are sending positive signals to the Iraq government and vice versa (an Iraqi delegation paid its respects in Riyadh on 16 February on the occasion of the death of Prince Sattam bin Abd al-Aziz.

Today, rightly or wrongly, Turkey and Qatar are viewed as the problem nations, though of course the suicide bombers are still largely young Saudis. “The Qataris are paying money for the Saudis to kill themselves,” one Iraqi told me.

But the demonstrations keep coming. The grievances are expressed clearly. They want less “debaathification”  by which they mean the policy by which people are kept out of politics, even out of employment in certain circumstances if they were ever senior members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party, for instance as university professors. The trouble is that some people (around about 4,000 Iraqis) were senior members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party. When the liberation of Iraq was on the cards the American State Department had an idea of starting a Truth and Reconciliation committee for Iraq as was done in South Africa, but the US Defense Department stomped on the notion. Such a shame.

Less debaathification is one demand. Another is the release of prisoners. Another is the rescinding of article four on the anti-terrorist legislation which is one of the more widely used articles in the judicial system and says, basically, that life imprisonment is the punishment for “anyone who intentionally covers up any terrorist act or harbors a terrorist with the purpose of concealment.” Sunnis see this law as disproportionately targeting them and the controversial Speaker of Iraq’s parliament, Osama Najefi, has said it would be rescinded.

Iraq’s Deputy Premier Hussein al-Sharistani is negotiating with the demonstrators. But the problem is that some of them are very radical, wanting the removal of all debaathification laws and the release of all prisoners (whatever their crime), indeed some of the demands border on the ridiculous and perhaps are deliberately couched in terms that can never be satisfied.

The view in Iraq is sanguine. Many members of the government think that the West is promoting Salafism in unrelenting fashion. Meanwhile Iraq has to face provincial elections on April 20^th of this year. Well let me re-phrase that. Most of Iraq will face elections. The Kurdish region will not as they refuse to have them. They are frightened that the traditional parties (Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK) will do less well. Indeed there is a danger that Talabani’s PUK have grown so unpopular they will be wiped out. The thing about these elections is that they are an indication of what may happen in the January 2014 parliamentary elections. They need to go well and against a backdrop of increasingly aggressive sectarian demonstrations that will not be easy.

In other respects things are better in Iraq with one big caveat. The infrastructure law has not been passed which would allow major projects, like port building, to get moved forward. This is because parliament is not functioning. If they meet, the MPs just fight, by which I mean they thump each other. Malaki’s Dawa could force it through with the cooperation of the Kurdish bloc but the Kurds are demanding 17% of the money and the money is $70 billion. Seems reasonable but the difficulty is they are double-counting because they, in theory but not necessarily in practice, already get 17% of the national budget. You’d think this issue could be resolved in negotiation. It is ridiculous that Iraq’s development is being held back because of childish petty infighting. This is one reason we need free and fair parliamentary elections swiftly. January 2014 is just not soon enough. And we do not need the streets in chaos to do it. This spill over of Syria into Iraq bodes ill.

Bahrain

Elsewhere things bode well. Another country facing elections in 2014, though fortunately perhaps towards the end of the year, is Bahrain. Their ‘national dialogue’ has just got underway and the opposition would like to see it lead to powersharing with a constitutional monarchy. At least there is something going on to try and find a way forward. The key issue is to strengthen those calling for moderation like Sheikh Isa Qasim, Bahrain’s most influential Shi’a cleric. The difficulty from the government’s perspective is that more and more Bahrainis are rejecting parliamentary democracy in favour of street protest. If we see the mainstream opposition fail to participate in the 2014 elections, it bodes ill for Bahrain’s future and indeed for the future of the moderate opposition.

The deaths of both a protester and a policeman at Friday's demonstrations might complicate the national dialogue process which had been helped by the government agreeing to become a "party" to the talks, instead of just a "convening" entity between the "loyalist" and "opposition" political societies.

Ultimately however, political reform will probably only succeed if the Government of Bahrain is permitted by the Saudis to sacrifice the long-standing Prime Minister (Bahrain has the longest serving premier in the world and his removal is a key opposition demand).

On Iran

The forthcoming elections in Iran bode well for the future too, largely because they mark the end of President Ahmadinejad. Key contenders are Valiyati and Qalibaf. Qalibaf (Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf) is the one to watch. He is a pilot and he’s good with media. He was a General in the IRGC and is Mayor of Tehran. He knows Europe. He did many positive things whilst in charge of Tehran. His emphasis is on the economy. He is not radical, not narrow minded. He is middle-aged. Valiyati could win and has his own network, but he’s an old man now.

The reformists will also put forward a candidate of course. It will be either Mohammad-Ali Najafi or Hassan Rohani or Mohammad-Reza Aref – just one of them.

Perhaps 20 candidates will stand in all. But there are four principal groups:

1. The Ahmajinedati
2. The Principalists
3. The Reformists
4. The Independents

These groups will all watch each other hopefully ensuring that the elections are reasonably fair this time. The Principalists and the Reformists are pragmatic. The election will be in June.

Better times ahead then? Maybe. But if the Syrian civil war spills into Iraq all bets are on hold. Here at the NCF we will be focussing on Iraq a little more in the coming months. Do not expect us to pull our punches.

Will Barzani's initiative resolve the Iraqi crisis?

Following months of speculation there appears to be hope for reconciliation among the Iraqi factions. President of Kurdistan Region Masood Barzani has proposed holding a National Conference in Erbil at the end of the month inviting the various Iraqi political groups to discuss the deteriorating political situation in the country. Some say this move was initiated by US Ambassador to Iraq who has been in talks with Barzani to make a move towards National Dialogue.  

The proposal was met by overwhelming approval from representatives of the different political groups. State of Law Coalition (SLC) led by Nuri al-Maliki expressed their support for President Barzani's initiative which is set to take place at the end of the month. Samira al-Moussawi, representative of SLC told “Shafaq News” that the party welcomed any plans to resolve the current situation provided that it is “within the framework of the Constitution and the Law”. Al-Moussawi stressed the importance of this meeting in bringing together the different political blocs to the table of dialogue and reaching a sustainable solution to solve the crisis.

Speaking to al-Hayat newspaper, Shakir al-Daraji of SLC expressed his party's willingness to participate in any initiative that would assist in taking Iraq out of its current crisis provided that there are no pre-proposed conditions by any one party. The agreement to dialogue between SLC and Barzani may be seen as a step forward towards peace and reconciliation following months of on-going battle and escalating dispute which almost led to military confrontation between the two most dominating powers in Iraq.

In a public statement, Adnan al-Mufti, representative of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party (PUK) announced that Barzani has been holding talks with delegates from the different political groups including representatives of Iraqqiya, State of Law Coalition and Sadr bloc. Evidently the meetings held in Kurdistan have led to general consensus on the importance of organizing an extended meeting for all the Iraqi groups to reach some level of agreement on the outstanding issues and conflicts through national dialogue.

In a statement posted on the Kurdistan Presidency website Barzani re-affirmed that Iraq was going through a rough period of political instability and the meeting due to be held in Erbil must result in long-term radical solutions and all political factions must demonstrate “commitment to the Constitution”. Finally, Barzani stated that “the Kurds are always part of the political solution, working full capacity to resolve outstanding problems.”

Special Report on Iraq

As the Syrian war continues to affect the region, we are broadening the remit of our reports

This report is in three sections:

1.      Comment from a senior public figure from Iraq

2.      Background on Iraq / Syria relations

3.      Background on Iraq’s internal politics

There have been dramatic developments in Iraq in recent weeks that affect both Iraq and the region as a whole. One of Iraq’s more prominent public figures, whose name we shall withhold, recently briefed the NCF on developments in that country. He started by talking about Kurdish ambitions for Syria: “the Kurds want to see a greater Kurdistan that includes Syria’s Kurdish region. Obviously that is a problem for the Turks who have their own Kurds with political ambitions. Indeed the issue is all the more sensitive for the Turks because the PKK controls the mountainous country in Northern Syria near the Kurdish border.

“However, the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, has other things on his mind apart from greater Kurdistan. Massoud is concerned that there might be a deal between President Talibani of Iraq, who heads the PUK faction, and the new political faction on the Kurdish scene, which goes by the name of Goran. Because of this fear, Barzani has had no choice but to make a deal with Premier Malaki of Iraq. Now this is a new deal. You may have it in your head that Barzani and Malaki are bitter rivals. That was then, this is now.

“Everything in the Middle East is becoming more sectarian. Prime Minister Malaki of Iraq will be the last Iraqi premier to preside over a united Iraq. This is because the Sunnis want to see a federal Iraq, in which the regions get many of the privileges at present reserved for the Kurds. People like Osama Najaifi, the speaker of Iraq’s parliament and Saad el Bazz, one of Iraq’s more prominent businessmen, are promoting a federal Iraq in which Mosul, Anbar and Salahaddin and some parts of Diyala get autonomous status. Rafa al Asawe, the Minister of Finance, has been working hard to bring this about. Meanwhile, (Iraqi businessman – name withheld) continues to support the secular Iraqia Party. He is the man who has always funded them but his future funding is said to be predicated on getting Alawi (the founder and head of Iraqia and a man of Shi’ite extraction with secular beliefs) shifted from his post.

“What all this means is that when we see a new national election for Iraq in 2014, the political parties will appeal either to Kurds or to Sunnis or to Shia. Those few remaining old party lists and coalitions that appealed across ethnic divides will largely cease to exist. The beginning of the end for non-sectarian politics in Iraq was the last elections, when small local governorate based constituencies were introduced. What this meant was that politics became much more sectarian. But why should we worry? Iraq is not a natural nation state, the British drew this map.”

We asked why Talibani had decided to withdraw the vote of no confidence in Premier Malaki a couple of months back:

“Remember the context:

1.       “Talibani made that deal with Goran against Massoud Barzani because both Jalal Talibani and the Goran group were weak politically so they needed to unite to compete with Massoud.

2.       “There are other factors as well. Former US Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Kahlilzad, who is a close friend of Massoud’s, persuaded Massoud that the Kurdish region should attempt a big oil deal with Exxon Mobile. Exxon went to work in the north and Talibani stopped the vote of no confidence in Maliki.

“Do you understand? Talibani could not allow Massoud Barzani to become too powerful, to become the ‘great one’ in the north because Talibani and his own the PUK would lose everything.

“And now, there is no possibility of a vote of no confidence in Malaki because Massoud has switched his position and now he wants to be close to Maliki. There are other things you should understand here that President Obama has failed to grasp. Massoud is the man of the Turkish, Jalal Talabani is the man of Iran. There have been spats between Maliki and Massoud Barzani but these are issue specific and are not current. For instance, the temporary bridge between Syria and Iraq, built many years ago by British engineers, which still continues to carry traffic, was being used for weapons. Massoud did not want the Iraq Army coming anywhere near the bridge and seeing what was going on, so he stopped them with his Peshmerga fighters. This made Malaki extremely angry and might have derailed everything in Iraq. But the USA, who obviously have colossal influence over Massoud, told both Massoud and Maliki to cool it. Massoud had no choice. The Kurds want a big Kurdish state, but if the Turks grasp the full extent of Kurdish political ambitions, it will be a problem for Massoud, so he decided to keep his head down. None the less, Massoud will do everything he can to create a Kurdish state at the time of Iraq’s elections in 2014.

“Meanwhile there are other geopolitical issues. Iran and the Turks want to find a way to create some sort of alliance despite their differences over Syria and the Arab Gulf states are frightened by this idea. They are also frightened by the prospect of the Syrian civil war spreading to Jordan. The war in Jordan will begin after the Syria war has settled down and will happen because Jordan has big economic problems. After Jordan it will be Saudi Arabia’s turn.

“The whole Middle East is in a state of transition. There is a generational conflict in Saudi Arabia, whilst everybody regards Qatar as a disposable state. These are interesting times.”

IRAQ – RESPONSES TO SYRIA

Iraq claims that a Syrian jet entered Iraqi airspace. During the past week the Syrian army has been launching air strikes against the border town of Albu Kamal and the number of refugees trying to get into Iraq is rising.

The sectarian divisions in the region are also causing Iraq problems. The Iraqi government has not bowed to pressure from the Sunni Gulf States to condemn Assad outright. Iraq would be very worried should a Sunni hard-line government take power in Syria.

Iraqi Prime minister Nuri al-Maliki was to submit a plan at the conference in Tehran to end the conflict in Syria. The plan was for a Syrian government figure to negotiate with the opposition groups and then for elections to be held under Arab league and International supervision. The plan includes a demand that "foreign players to stop interfering in Syrian affairs".

IRAQ - BACKGROUND

On 15 December 2011, the American military formally ended its mission in Iraq. The elections in March 2010 led to the creation of a government of national unity, however, the unity has proved more notional than real. The day after the Americans’ departure, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a Shiite, broke decisively with the Sunnis the Americans had persuaded him to accept in his government. The government ordered the arrest of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, the nation’s highest-ranking Sunni, on charges of murder and terrorism. Mr. Hashimi fled to sanctuary in Iraq’s Kurdish region before moving to Turkey.

But most importantly, after the American military withdrawal, insurgent attacks have steadily increased. Assaults against Iraqi civilians and government officials swelled in late December 2011 and January 2012, as the country was gripped by a political crisis rooted in imbalances of power and festering conflicts between the Shiite prime minister and his largely Sunni and secular political opposition.

Many of the attacks of late 2011 and early 2012 are attributed to the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq. The terrorist group, an offshoot of Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in Baghdad on 22 December 2011. The explosions killed more than 63 people

June 2012, there was one of the deadliest months with about 200 people, mostly civilian pilgrims killed.

In July, in a coordinated display intended to show they remain a viable force, Iraqi insurgents launched at least 37 separate attacks throughout the country, setting off car bombs, storming a military base, attacking policemen in their homes and ambushing checkpoints. More than 190 people were killed in violence across Iraq since the start of August 2012, showing that insurgents remain a lethal force eight months after the last US troops left the country. There was no immediate claim of responsibility. Co-ordinated bombings are a favourite tactic of the al-Qaida-type-offshoot known as the Islamic State of Iraq.

On 24 August 2012, twin blasts, one exploding beside a pulpit during prayers, killed at least three people and wounded six.  It had become the latest in a wave of violence that punctuates Iraq's struggle to overcome insurgency. Heightened tension between Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds in the coalition government since U.S. withdrawal has raised fears of a return to sectarian violence of the kind that pushed Iraq to the brink of civil war a few years ago.

Iraq’s Kurdish Minority

Iraqi Kurdistan is an autonomous region of Iraq governed by the Kurdish Regional Government. It borders Iran to the east, Turkey to the north, Syria to the west and the rest of Iraq to the south. The establishment of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq came after years of heavy fighting, including the Anfal, and 1991 uprising of the Iraqi people against Saddam Hussain, when many Kurds were forced to flee the country to become refugees in Iran and Turkey. The US liberation of Iraq in 2003 followed by subsequent political changes led to the ratification of a new Iraqi Constitution in 2005, which defined Iraqi Kurdistan as a federal entity within Iraq.

However tension between the central Iraqi Government and the Kurdish Regional Government increased. Iraq's central government has a long-standing disagreement with autonomous Kurdistan in the north over control of oil and territory along their internal border. Baghdad maintains it alone has the right to export Iraqi crude. But Kurdistan has moved ahead with signing exploration deals with oil majors such as Exxon and Chevron, which the central government rejects as illegal.

Crude produced in Kurdistan is fed into Iraq's Kirkuk export stream and sold onto world markets via the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. In an interim agreement in January 2011, Baghdad approved payments to companies in Kurdistan for exploration and extraction costs. That agreement called for Kurdish authorities to supply 175,000 barrels per day of oil exports and Baghdad to route 50 percent of the KRG's export earnings to Kurdistan to cover producing companies' costs.

In April 2012, Kurdistan halted exports, saying Baghdad had not made payments to companies working there, but it restarted shipments on August 7 (following improvements in the relationship between Barzani and Malaki) with a warning they could be halted again in a month if there were no payments. Iraq says Kurdistan's oil shipments have fluctuated around 100,000 to 120,000 barrels per day since they restarted, below the 175,000 bpd that Baghdad says was agreed with Kurdistan. Kurdish authorities still needed to present receipts showing company expenses and more auditing is needed before any payments are approved. Iraq approved a payment of close to $560 million to oil producers operating in the north in return for their investment costs to develop oilfields in the Kurdish region. But officials are still waiting for the go-ahead to transfer the money.

Nevertheless, Iraq's Kurdistan announced its willingness to restart negotiations with Baghdad to end the political crisis, focusing on a long-delayed oil law to hand regional authorities more say in managing energy resources, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Rosh Nuri al-Shawish, a Kurd, said. Shawish added that Kurdish officials had met with the head of the Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Shi'ite National Alliance, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, for preliminary talks, and the atmosphere had improved enough for them to see room for progress.

How does Syrian conflict affect Iraq?

Spillover from Syria worries an Iraqi government struggling to overcome its own insurgency and legacy of sectarian violence. Baghdad acknowledges that Sunni Islamist fighters are crossing the porous border to fight against President Bashar al-Assad.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was re-elected in 2010, thanks in part to Iran's support for Iraqi Shi'ite political parties. Among Iraq's Shi'ite leadership, however, there may be little love for Assad, whose government Iraq had blamed for allowing Sunni insurgents and suicide bombers to cross over from Syria to attack U.S. and Iraqi troops at the height of the war.

Justice for Iraqi Kurds

 

JUSTICE FOR IRAQI KURDS

Join us in our call to the British Government to recognise the mass murder of Kurdish people in Iraq as an act of genocide.

Sign the petition here: http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk/petitions/31014 or scan the QR code above on your phone to sign the petition.

British MP Nadhim Zahawi has launched a petition to encourage the British Government to recognize
the genocide of Iraqi Kurds prior to and during Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime. The petition requires
100,000 signatures from the public to trigger a debate in Parliament and we would be very grateful for your support. 

Please sign the petition and spread the word.

What happened during the genocide?

From the 1960s until the late 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds were slaughtered. They were gassed with chemical weapons, shot, starved, ‘disappeared’, imprisoned and executed.
There are an estimated 270 mass graves in Iraq containing between 10 and 10,000 bodies in each grave. An estimated 180,000 Kurdish people were killed between 1987 and 1988 alone during
Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaign called Anfal. During the genocide campaign, 90% of Kurdish villages and more than 20 small towns and cities were completely destroyed during the campaign to wipe out the Kurdish population in Iraq.

Before this issue can be debated in the House of Commons there is a need for a 100,000 signatures to the petition. This is, of course, outrageous, as the British Government and forces fought so hard to free Iraq from the tyranny and offered the Kurds air cover to try and stop the massacres. So if we knew about it, why are we making a debate on this so difficult? 

 If we do not set the bar high for such recent atrocities, we will never set an example to Syria on their own disgraceful behaviour. 

Follow the campaign on twitter at  http://www.kurdishblogger.com 
or on the website www.justice4genocide.com 

Maliki etching out the path towards authoritarianism

Democracy in Iraq is under threat again. Prime Minister Nour Maliki’s obvious attempts to undermine the already fragile political process shows no sign of abating as Faraj al-Haidari, the head of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), and Kareem al-Tamimi were jailed last week on charges of bribery.

The allegations, which were initially made last year and rejected by the courts, centre around the payment of around $100 made to people working overtime at the IHEC in 2010; money, it is accused, taken wrongfully out of the electoral commissions’ coffers. In a country ripe with corruption, where billions of dollars from oil deals get passed surreptitiously from dubious politicians to dodgy businessmen, these are such minor charges that they cry a political motive.

Haidari, speaking from his cell in Baghdad, said that the initial court ruling was only overturned once Hanan al-Fatlawi approached the court last year. Al-Fatlawi is a member of Maliki’s political bloc. It is no wonder that such apparent meddling in this case has taken place. The IHEC is centrally important to the democratic process. It is the largest independent electoral commission in Iraq, and was integral in overseeing the 2010 elections in a climate of violence and intimidation; IHEC workers were constantly threatened in their work.

Hairdari and Maliki clashed then, over the issue of vote counting. Maliki wanted thousands of votes for Iraqiya discredited, Haidari stood his ground. But now he has been made a scapegoat in the continuing attempts by Maliki to shore up his power. Having failed in taking the IHEC under Parliament’s power (Maliki faced strong Parliamentary opposition from the other blocs in his attempt), he is looking to fell Haidari on minor corruption charges.

The country already faces a political power struggle, with Vice President Tarek al-Hashemi hounded by Maliki on murder charges, his bodyguards tortured to death. Hashemi, who initially hid in Kurdistan before fleeing the country, has insisted that he is being pursued by the security forces and not the judges. At a NCF working group lunch Hemen Hawrami, President Barzani’s right hand man, accused Maliki of politicising the case. Maliki will face a mounting opposition from the other political parties over these issues. Hashemi has said that he will discuss with the Kurdish and Shia parties to form an alliance to topple Maliki before the 2014 elections.

A recent NCF blog highlighted the need for Western media to report Iraqi sectarianism with care. What should also be reported are Maliki’s clear attempts to delegitimize the fragile political process in Iraq as he drags the country towards an authoritarian and sectarian state.

Spotlight on Baghdad: Iraq and the Arab League Summit

The 23^rd Annually Arab League Summit was held in Baghdad from the 27-29^th March.  It was the first time Iraq has hosted an Arab League summit since 1990, before the start of the Gulf War.  Furthermore it was the first high profile event staged by the country since the withdrawal of US armed force in December 2011.  The event gave Prime Minister Nouri Maliki a chance to show that his Iraq can play a part on the world stage without an American crutch.

The cost of summit was reported to be over $500 million, with the vast sum that could have been spent on renovating Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone, refurbishing hotels, planting flowers and resurfacing roads, used by the delegations.  Most noticeable for ordinary Iraqi’s was the ramped up security, who imposed tight curfews, road blocks and security check points, much to the frustration of local traders who’s business were disrupted.  Yet despite the precautions there was a suicide attack in Baghdad on 27^th March that left one person dead and four injured. Two days later three rockets were fired towards the Green Zone - luckily no one was hurt.

Many Iraqi’s were less than impressed by the summit; they see Maliki’s investment as a purely superficial one.  The people of the Baghdad would be far happier if their government could repair the power grid and other basic amenities rather than host delegations from the neighbour states. The Iraqi capital still has bad roads, long power-cuts and a shaky water and sewage system.

Yet despite the misgivings of his electorate, Maliki saw the chance to host the summit as an opportunity to reintegrate his country in the fold with the rest of Arab league.  He has moved away from Iran and closer to rival Arab heavyweights Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Speaking in a Saudi newspaper, he called for greater Arab unity and countered misgivings about Iraq’s close ties to Iran.  Iraq also agreed to pay $400 million to Egyptian workers, money owed to them from before the first Gulf War.  In contrast Iran was not invited to send a delegation to the summit.

The main focus of the summit was of course the violence in Syria.   The Arab world, despite broadly supporting Kofi Annan’s six point peace plan, remains divided on the issue.  Saudi Arabia and Qatar are calling for prompt, tough action against Bashar al Assad, and before the summit were openly in favour of arming the Free Syrian Army. 

In contrast Iraq and Lebanon, anxious about the future stability of Syria if Assad was to fail, favour a negotiated solution. Maliki used the Baghdad summit to urge caution; he warned of the dangers of a "proxy war" if foreign powers were to arm the different factions within Syria.  He made it clear Iraq was not in favour of outside intervention in Syria

As the delegates departed on the 29^th of March, they all acknowledged that it would it take time to resolve the situation in Syria.  Yet despite Assad accepting Annan’s plan his oppression continues - the UN estimates more than 9,000 people have been killed.

Notes from a meeting with the Kurdistan Democratic Party 15/3/12

Representative from the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Hemen Hawrami, led discussions in London about issues facing his party and the Kurdistan Regional Government.  Hawrami explained that as the largest party in the Kurdistan political process, the KDP has played a vital role in the success achieved by the KRG; Since 2005 Iraqi Kurdistan has become a well developed, constitutional part of Iraq.  The region is regarded as safe and secure and there has been an increase in foreign investment, income per capita and a fall in unemployment.

The KRG believe the main challenge facing Iraqi Kurdistan is from interference from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who they believe wants central control of all of Iraq from Baghdad.  The KRG advocate a democratic, pluralistic Iraq, but claim that the central government are not moving the country in that direction.  Instead, the Kurds see the Iraqi government becoming centralised and more authoritarian under Maliki.  Increasingly the Kurds are feeling less and less that they are being treated as federal partners in the government of Iraq.

There are further issues surrounding the repatriation of the Kirkuk province.  The KDP want to return the Kurds and Turqmen who were removed from Kirkuk by the Ba’ath Party.  The KDP also want to remove the Arabs that were sent in to ‘Arabise’ the region, a process Hawrami called “normalisation”.  However a major stumbling block is the cost the ‘normalisation’; Hawrami claims that it is going to cost an estimated $1.5 billion, but the Iraqi government is only willing to contribute $150 million.  Ultimately the KDP hope that the original people of Kirkuk should then be the ones who decide their political future, they believe that a referendum in Kirkuk is vital for people so that they can decide if they want to be Kurd, autonomous, or Iraqi.

There are further issues between the KRG and Baghdad over oil production.  The KRG maintains that the oil of Iraq belongs to all Iraqis, but they hope that any new oil fields should be run by the territories they are found in, in coordination with the federal government. Despite fears that Baghdad will try to maintain control over any new oil fields the KRG has passed its own law to make Iraqi Kurdistan capable of producing all its own oil - estimated to be 275,000 barrels of oil a year.  Under the oil revenue sharing agreement, 83% of the oil revenue in Kurdistan currently goes to the Iraqi government, but the KRG would like to have control over any new oilfields in the Kurdish zone. 

A final key point of friction between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad is related to the make up the security forces in Iraq.  The KRG stress that they are eligible to have their own security forces as part of Iraq’s defence system.    Currently the armed Kurdish fighters, the Peshmerga, have been responsible for security of the Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq since the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Despite this the Iraqi government refuses to recognise them as part of the Iraqi defence system.  As a result Baghdad does not contribute substantially to the cost of upkeep this force, even though they have been securing large stretches of the Northern Iraqi border for a number of years.

The KDP also has concerns over the ethnic makeup of the Iraqi military - Currently out of 14 divisions in the national army, there is only one Sunni division and one Kurdish division.  Hawarmi, and the KDP, worry about the lack of balance and fear that the Iraqi military may not treating Iraqi Kurdistan as friendly.  With that in mind the KRG cannot support any plans for funding the Iraqi military until there is a grantee that the military will not be used for internal conflict.   

Hawarmi also spoke at length about the current situation in Syria.  With more than 2 million Kurds in Syria, any decisions affecting Syria’s Kurdish population affects Iraqi Kurdistan.  Hawarmi stressed that the KRG believed in the importance of system change rather than regime change.     The KRG believe Syria needs a pluralistic, secular and democratic system.  The KRG support the Syrian Kurds’ dream of autonomy, but urges them to be realistic, stating that autonomy can only realistically be achieved within the confines of the territorial integrity of Syria.

Finally Hawarmi discussed the improving relations with Turkey; Turkish companies continue to invest in Kurdistan and there are now more than 1000 Turkish companies operating in Iraqi Kurdistan, eclipsing the sizable investment of Iranian and British firms.  The KDP hoped the Turkish based armed separatist group, the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK, could “silence their arms” and engage in a peaceful political campaign.  In the future it is hoped that President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani, will hold national conference for all Kurds promote democratic and civil movement and denounce violence.

  

Meeting KRG in London

Head of Foreign Relations tells British seminar of concerns about political crisis in Iraq

Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir the Head of the Department Foreign Relations had a packed schedule on his visit to the UK. He met FCO Minister Alistair Burt, participated in the FCO’s Future of the Middle East conference and spoke at a Next Century Foundation think tank seminar. He said that the Kurdistan Region is very worried about Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s maneouvres against other Iraqi politicians. 

A conference about Iraq and Kurdistan was organized by the NCF on Tuesday 17. The meeting was held at the new Kurdish Region Government representative office in London, with the presence of William, the Head of the KRG Department of Foreign Relations Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir, and the KRG High Representative to the UK Bayan Sami Adbul Rahman. Since the withdrawal of the US troops in December, worries have increased about the situation in the country, and especially in the Kurdistan region, whose minority was particularly targeted under the Saddam’s regime.
At the moment the situation in Iraq is especially problematic, with an escalation risk to a sectarian bloody conflict among the three main Sunnis, Shiite and Kurdish groups. The KRG Minister referred in particular to the “Hashemi case”: Iraq’s Vice President has been accused of running death squads assassinating Shiite government members and asked to face a trial, but at the moment the Sunni leader is hosted in the Kurdish region, under the protection of Barzani’s government. The case is a high-sensitive issue today, and Kurds are particularly concern for its consequences. During the meeting, KRG Minister Bakir stated that the first aim of his government is to reconcile the parts, avoiding a dangerous escalation of the issue, and that Kurds are willing to play a role as negotiators to facilitate the settlement of the dispute. The Kurdish authorities are especially worried about the possible use of this case as a pretext to discuss the post Saddam political structure of Iraq as a federalist state and its division of power.
Federalism is seen as the best solution for Iraq, and the respect of the Federalist Constitution is considered the key factor for the future of the country, and the only way for the Kurdish people to be part of an Iraqi state. The respect of the Constitution is important not only for the division of political power in the country, but also in sharing oil revenues and facing the dispute territories issues. In this sense, using at best its special autonomous status, the Kurdistan Region is becoming a quiet stable and secure area in an increasing hard nation. As illustrated during the meeting, security condition in Kurdistan are far better than in the rest of Iraq, and the reconstruction phase is greatly benefitting from this. Many states and foreign companies are attracted in Kurdistan, signing contracts for the exploitation of its oil resources and the construction of infrastructures destroyed during the war. Kurdish authorities are eager to build good relations with foreign countries: among them, special places are reserved to Turkey, Iran, the US, France, the UK, and some Arab states. The necessity to create a solid diversified economy goes along with foreign investments and the development of florid partnerships with these countries. External relations present also some challenges to the Kurdish government, with regards to two neighbouring countries as Iran and Syria. With its numerous Kurdish community, the developments of the Syrian struggle are particularly concerning the Arbil government, which is trying to help the divided Syrian Kurdish reality.
Many obstacles but also some relevant good steps are the balance sheet of the Kurdish experience in the post Saddam Iraq so far. As the KRG representatives in London highlighted, Kurdistan could become a positive element for both Iraq and the entire region, as an example of democracy, stability and development. 2012 will be a crucial year for its aspirations, and the first priority will be to take hard decisions to stabilize the fragile current Iraqi coalition, preventing a possible bloody collapse into a civil war.

Reckoning with past crimes

Last week, London was the location of a three-day conference about Iraq, entitled “Looking Toward International Recognition of the Dictatorial Former Regime’s Crime and Violations”. The conference was intended to draw attention to the crimes committed by Saddam’s regime during its long reign, atrocities that caused several hundred-thousand deaths, and whose consequences are still significant in today’s Iraqi struggles. With the participation of the Iraqi Minister of Human Rights, the Minister of Martyrs and Anfals’ Affairs and Iraq’s Ambassador in the UK, the principal aim of the conference was to “internationalize” these crimes by getting international support both by states and organizations in recognizing the nature and the size of what happened. Still today, numbers are disputed, with 1 to 3 million people killed. Almost every ethnical and religious minority and opposition group was oppressed: Kurdish minority was particularly targeted, with the Anfal campaign conducted between 1986 and 1989, and its peak in the Halabja massacre in March 1988. International recognition of Saddam’s crimes would help in reviewing Iraqi past, according to the current Iraq’s government, shedding light on what happened. The goal is not only to compensate the victims, but also to clarify responsibilities and to prosecute the authors of the crimes.
The conference was also the opportunity to illustrate the results of mass graves protection programmes in Iraq, a work started in 2005 with specific laws approved to exhume the hundreds of sites supposed to contain the rests of Saddam’s victims. Also with mass graves, numbers are still uncompleted: at the moment, excavations have started in more the 70 sites, but more than 160 cases are presumed all over the country. Besides identifying and giving a decent burial to the victims, the campaign is aimed to prove the reality of former regime’s actions, against any attempt to reduce the dimensions or even the existence of what happened. Despite many technical difficulties – lack of proper DNA laboratories for the identifications, sites still contaminated by chemical products, presence of mines in the graves – and the vast amount of money required to complete this programme, mass graves recognition is considered a national aim by the current Iraqi authorities, and operations are running fast.
Speaking at the audience, Iraqi Minister of Human Rights stressed the importance of human rights in politics, and the role Iraq is playing as a “pilot country” in the region by adopting democratic standards; but this was the only reference during the conference to the current troubling situation of the Gulf country. Quiet interesting, the mass graves programmes will investigate only the former regime responsibility, ignoring crimes committed after 2003, atrocities that took place under the US occupation and the new Baghdad government. This choice, to mark a clear line between the past and the present conditions and responsibilities, is a great concern for the current Iraqi parties in power, but can lead the programme to be accused of biased political purposes, rather than cultivating Iraqi national interests. For instance, Kurd minorities complain that the programme is neglecting their claims about supposed more mass grave sites, concentrating on other parts of Iraq. In this sense, the legitimate operation of historical clarification and justice has not to be mixed with today’s political reasons, useful to the current Iraqi political elites but really dangerous to the security and stability of an already confused and troublesome domestic situation.